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Union's Duty of Fair
Representation and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Implementation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, dealing with discrimination by labor unions, may
conflict with some of the currently recognized remedies
under the federal labor statutes for discriminatory prac-
tices of labor unions. This article proposes a theory of
accommodation in the administration of the federal
labor statutes and title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The
author concludes that many of the remedies developed
under the labor statutes to ensure fair treatment by
unions should stand. On the other hand, an appraisal of
the possibilities of conflict with the choice made by
Congress to implement title VII indicates that unfair
labor practice remedies of the NLRB should yield to
the procedures for affirmative relief contemplated by
title VII for discrimination covered by that title.
Herbert L. Sherman, Jr.*
The effective date for the key provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 is July 2, 1965? There is potential con-
flict between implementation of these provisions of the statute
and the continuation of currently recognized remedies for racial
discrimination under the federal labor statutes. The greatest
threat of conflict is posed by the holding of the NLRB3 that
breach of a union's duty of fair representation by racially dis-
criminatory conduct is an unfair labor practice under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.4
One commentator has aptly observed:
An already existing problem is aggravated by the enactment of
title VII-by what means is the Government to coordinate its policy
*Professor of Law and Industrial Relations, University of Pittsburgh; Visit-
ing Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, Spring 1965.
1. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. N§ 2000a to h-6.
2. Section 716(a)-(b), 78 Stat. 266, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e.
3. Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.), 56 L.R.R.M. 1289
(July 1, 1964).
4. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. H§ 141-87 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 ( Supp. V, 1964).
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in the area of employment discrimination? At least four groups are
involved at various levels in effectuating the general goal of equal
employment opportunity: the Department of Justice, the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, the National Labor
Relations Board, and the newly created Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. . . . [C]onferences may be effective in achieving
coordination at the policy planning level, but the problem of jurisdic-
tional conflicts at the operational level will remain for the courts to
work out under their appellate and enforcement jurisdictions.5
On February 8, 1965, President Johnson issued an Executive
order which created the Council on Equal Opportunity. The pur-
pose of the Council is to coordinate civil rights policies. Although
the Council's membership includes representatives of numerous
departments and committees in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment, the NLRB, an independent agency, is not represented
on the Council.
The purpose of this article is to show how the federal statutes,
bearing on the union's duty of fair representation, should be
construed. Particular attention will be paid to the question
whether a union's breach of its duty of fair representation should
be viewed as an unfair labor practice under the National Labor
Relations Act.
The principal theme of this article is that the federal statutes
bearing on this question should be construed in such a manner as
to bring about the greatest amount of accommodation without
doing an injustice to victims of discrimination, yet with due
regard for the practical problems involved in the administration
of these statutes. Although the matter of conceptual consistency
will be analyzed, it should be stressed that the basic position
advocated here is concerned more with the administrative prob-
lems involved in meshing the provisions of the relevant statutes.
Part I will trace the development of the duty of fair represen-
tation, first under the Railway Labor Act and then under the
National Labor Relations Act. This part will review the genesis
of the duty, the applicability of the duty to the negotiation stage
and the administration of the contract stage of collective bargain-
ing, the kinds of cases to which the duty has been applied, the
existence or lack of existence of judicial and administrative
remedies for breach of the duty, and the specific nature of the
remedies where available. Part I will lay the groundwork for
consideration of the points of potential conflict between enforce-
ment of the duty of fair representation under these statutes and
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part II
5. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684, 690 (1965).
6. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (58 L.R.R.) 189 (Feb. 15, 1965).
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will note the applicability of title VII to labor union activities
and the overlap with the duty of fair representation. Part III
will show how the federal statutes discussed in parts I and II
should be accommodated.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
A. RAMLWAY LABoR AcT
1. Judicial Relief
The genesis of the duty of fair representation is found in the
Supreme Court's 1944 opinion in Steele v. Loui&ville & N.R.R.7
The Court held that the Railway Labor Acts imposes upon a
union, which is acting as exclusive bargaining representative of
a group of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, a duty
to represent all the employees fairly. The union must not engage
in hostile discrimination in making contracts. Although the Court
recognized that valid differences might exist - based upon sen-
iority, the type of work to be performed, and the competence
and skill with which it is performed, the Court declared that
discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant
and invidious. Employing broad reasoning, the Court clearly
intimated that invidious discrimination not based upon race
would also violate the duty of fair representation. The Court
concluded by holding that the Railway Labor Act contemplates
resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and an award
-of damages for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Although the Negro firemen in this case were not members
of the union, they were members of the bargaining unit repre-
sented by the union. Hence they were owed a duty of fair rep-
resentation. This duty was breached when the union negotiated
a contract provision imposing employment restrictions on Negroes.
Following the Steele case, judicial relief was granted in a
number of other cases where railroad workers were victims of
racial discrimination imposed by unions.' The reasoning of the
7. 323 U.S. 192. As long as the union has majority status, the duty of
fair representation exists even in the absence of certification. The opinion
in Steele does not turn upon any issue of certification. See Aaron, Some
Aspects of the Uniom's Duty of Fair Representation, 2 OHio ST. LJ. 39 (1961).
8. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. J§ 151-88 (1958).
9. In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944), the Court held that a suit, making allegations similar to those in
Steele, was a case "arising under" a law of Congress regulating commerce,
and therefore within the jurisdiction of the federal courts; and in Graham
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949), the Court held
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Court in Steele was extended to protect nonbargaining unit em-
ployees; and the reasoning was held to embrace a duty of fair
representation during the administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement as well as during the negotiation of the
agreement.
In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,0 the Court
invalidated an agreement which affected nonbargaining unit em-
ployees. In that case a union, composed of white brakemen, ob-
tained an agreement that certain work previously performed by
Negro porters should be performed by brakemen. The union
contended that the Steele doctrine did not apply because the
union represented only the brakemen and not the porters." The
Court rejected this argument saying, "The Federal Act thus
prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from using their position
and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order to bestow
them on white workers." And in Conley v. Gibson,'3 the Court
held that
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and in-
vidious" distinctions among those it represents does not come to an
abrupt end, as the respondents seem to contend, with the making of
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
H§ 101-15 (1958), did not preclude injunctive relief against the union's failure
to represent the Negro minority within the craft. Other decisions have found
breach of the duty of fair representation where the discrimination was on
nonracial grounds. Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1961); Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.
1953).
10. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
11. Id. at 772-73.
12. Id. at 774. The significance of this case is further pointed up by the
following language from Mr. Justice Minton's dissent:
The majority reaches out to invalidate the contract, not because
the train porters are brakemen entitled to fair representation by the
Brotherhood, but because they are Negroes who were discriminated
against by the carrier at the behest of the Brotherhood. I do not
understand that private parties such as the carrier and the Brotherhood
may not discriminate on the ground of race. Neither a state govern-
ment nor the Federal Government may do so, but I know of no ap-
plicable federal law which says that private parties may not. That is
the whole problem underlying the proposed Federal Fair Employment
Practices Code. Of course, this Court by sheer power can say that this
case is Steele, or even lay down a code of fair employment practices.
But sheer power is not a substitute for legality. I do not have to agree
with the discrimination here indulged in to question the legality of
today's decision.
Id. at 777-78.
13. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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an agreement between union and employer . . . . A contract may be
fair and impartial on its face yet administered in such a way, with
the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly discrimina-
tory against some members of the bargaining unit.' 4
Hence the Court held that Negro employees were entitled to relief
against a railroad brotherhood which failed to represent them
fairly in their protest of discriminatory discharges.
2. Administrative Remedy
Although it was clearly established by the Supreme Court,
prior to adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that the courts
have the power to grant relief to employees against unions en-
gaging in racial discrimination in violation of the duty of fair
representation imposed by the Railway Labor Act, no adminis-
trative remedy against the union was found to exist. Even though
a union operating as exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway
Labor Act was found to have an obligation to represent all
employees in the bargaining unit fairly - both in the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements and in the administration of
them, there was no administrative body, such as the NLRB,
to which the victim of racial discrimination could turn for relief
against the union. The NLRB itself had no jurisdiction over
individuals employed by employers subject to the Railway Labor
Act.'5
Under the Railway Labor Act aggrieved employees can file
their own grievances against the employer with the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, and they can maintain suit against
the employer for breach of contract. But such procedures do not
provide relief against the union; and, as pointed out by the
Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, individuals or small groups
of employees do not possess the bargaining power of their repre-
sentative in negotiating with the employer or in presenting their
grievances to him."'
In Conley, where Negro employees were discharged or de-
moted so that white employees could take their jobs, the union
argued that the National Railroad Adjustment Board had ex-
14. Id. at 46. (Footnotes omitted.)
15. The NLRA excludes from the definition of employer "any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time," and
excludes from the definition of employee "any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time."
49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1958).
16. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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clusive jurisdiction over the controversy. The union took the
position that Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act"i con-
ferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Adjustment Board because
the case involved interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement. The Court noted, however, that the sec-
tion of the statute cited by the union applies only to "disputes
between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers,"" and noted further that the complaint of the Negroes
did not involve a dispute between an employee and employer.
On the contrary, the complaint charged the union with failure
to represent the Negroes equally and in good faith. The Court
stated that
the Adjustment Board has no power under § 3 First (i) or any other
provision of the Act to protect them from such discrimination. Fur-
thermore, the contract between the Brotherhood and the Railroad
will be, at most, only incidentally involved in resolving this contro-
versy between petitioners and their bargaining agent.' 9
B. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs ACT
1. Judicial Relief
A union, which is serving as exclusive bargaining representative
of a group of employees under the National Labor Relations
Act,2 0 also has a duty to represent all the employees fairly. The
Supreme Court has indicated that judicial relief may be obtained
for breach of this duty.
In Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,21 two unions had been
certified by the N 1 RB as joint representatives for a bargaining
unit. When these unions merged into one, the members and
officers of the two unions agreed that a negotiating committee
would establish a single line of seniority in the new contract.
Contrary to the agreement, the committee established two sen-
17. Added by 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 158 First (i) (1958).
18. 355 U.S. at 44 & n.3.
19. Id. at 44. The National Railroad Adjustment Board is composed of
employer and union members, the latter being selected by what were, at the
iime of Conley, all-white unions. Even under the 1960 constitution of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, membership was re-
stricted to those who were "white-born, of good moral character, sober and
industrious." In 1963, however, the national convention of this union voted
to eliminate the racial bar to membership from its constitution. See NORGREN
& HILL, TowAnn FAin EMPLOYMENT 41 & n.1 (1964).
20. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (Supp. V, 1964).
21. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
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iority lines, one for Negroes and one for whites. Some of the
Negro union members brought suit in a federal district court,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the new seniority lines
were void.
A majority of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that no
federal question was involved but merely a violation of a "private
contract voluntarily made between the two groups of em-
ployees."" Judge Rives dissented, stating that the Negro mem-
bers were "constrained to accept racial discrimination because
of the duties imposed"" by section 8(d) of the NLRA. Hence
he concluded that federal law was involved.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision citing Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R.,2 4 Tun&tall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen," and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard2"
simply stated that "the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for fur-
ther proceedings."2 By citing these three cases, which held that
judicial relief was available for a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, the Court indi-
cated that judicial relief is likewise available for a union's breach
of its duty of fair representation under the National Labor Re-
lations Act.
These same three cases, cited by the Court in Syres, were
also cited by the Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman." In this
case the Court quoted provisions of the NLRA to show the broad
authority of a bargaining representative. It then stated that the
authority of a bargaining representative is not absolute as is
recognized in the three cited cases under "comparable provisions
of the Railway Labor Act."" Again, although the Court found
in the Huffman case that the union had not exceeded its authority
in negotiating certain seniority credit clauses for veterans, it did
indicate that judicial relief was available under the NILRA where
a union does breach its duty of fair representation.s
22. Id. at 744.
23. Id. at 747.
24. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
25. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
26. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
27. 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
28. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Although the Court has stated that the duty of
fair representation embraces nonracial discrimination, it has never found
breach of the duty in such cases.




Moreover, in Humphrey v. Moore,31 decided early in 1964
(prior to adoption of the Civil Rights Act), the Court implied that
an alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation states
a cause of action under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.3 2
The case arose when a company absorbed the operations of an-
other company and a joint conference committee, consisting of
employer and union representatives, decided that the seniority
of the affected employees should be dovetailed. The employees of
both companies were represented by the same local union. One
of the employees of the original company brought suit in a state
court, asserting that the committee had exceeded its power under
the collective bargaining agreement when it dovetailed the sen-
iority lists and that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation.
The Court held that the employee's action was in the nature
of an action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement.3 It
found that the committee had not exceeded its power under the
agreement," and that the union did not breach its duty of fair
representation.
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in the result, but he was dis-
turbed by the Court's treatment of the duty of fair representa-
tion. He stated that the duty is "derived not from the collective
bargaining contract but from the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended . .. ."" Mr. Justice Harlan would have set the case for
reargument and would have invited the NLRB to present its
views on a possible question of preemption.37
Professor Murphy has suggested that Humphrey might be
interpreted to mean that where a cause of action is otherwise
alleged under section 301, then the fair representation issue may
also be litigated; or that Humphrey might be interpreted to mean
that section 301 embraces a fair representation claim when it is
alleged that such unfair representation has resulted in a breach
of contract.?8 He concedes, however, that the validity of these
interpretations may be vitiated by a footnote to the Court's
31. 375 U.S. 335.
32. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
33. 375 U.S. at 843.
34. Id. at 347-48.
35. Id. at 350.
36. Id. at 351.
37. Id. at 360.
38. The Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, Address by
Professor William P. Murphy, 1964 Midwest Labor Conference, Ohio State




opinion which states that "even in the absence of § 5 [of the col-
lective bargaining agreement], however, it would be necessary to
deal with the alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion.""
Furthermore, the Court neatly sidestepped the preemption
issue by stating:
Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor
Management Relations Act, it is not necessary for us to resolve that
difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be, an unfair labor prac-
tice, the complaint here alleged that [petitioner's] . . . discharge would
violate the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal
and state courts .. . subject, of course, to the applicable federal law.40
If breach of a union's duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice under the NIRA, then it may be argued that
breach of the duty not associated with a breach of contract claim
is preempted by the NLRB under a long line of preemption
cases.41 But the Court has never resolved the underlying question
as to whether breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice. It left the question open not only in Humphrey,
but also in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddoxm in early 1965. In
the latter case the Court dismissed an individual employee's
claim for severance pay under a collective bargaining agreement
because he had not attempted to use the grievance procedure
leading to arbitration. The Court left open the question of remedy
if the union failed to handle the grievance or handled it in a per-
functory manner.
It is not surprising that the Court indicated in 1953 in the
Huffman case,43 and again in 1955 in the Syres case,4 4 that judi-
cial relief is available for breach of the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation under the NLRA. In the Huffman case the union had
39. 373 U.S. at 345 n.7.
40. Id. at 344. A state court has jurisdiction of a suit for violation of a
collective bargaining agreement which falls within the purview of § 801,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), but when exercising
this jurisdiction it must apply federal substantive law, Local 174, Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
41. E.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
"When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor
Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger
of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245.
42. 85 Sup. Ct. 614.
43. 345 U.S. 330.
44. 350 U.S. 892.
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challenged the jurisdiction of the federal court on preemption
grounds, alleging that one issue was whether it had engaged in
an unfair labor practice. But the NLRB submitted an amicus
brief in which it disclaimed authority to remedy violations by a
union of its duty of fair representation through the unfair labor
practice jurisdiction of the Board. The Court dealt with the ques-
tion in a footnote as follows:
This question was not argued in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned
in its opinion and, in view of our position on the merits, it is not dis-
cussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a
collective-bargaining representative to have such breadth that it re-
moves all ground for a substantial charge that International, by ex-
ceeding its authority, committed an unfair labor practice.45
By way of summation, it must be concluded that the Supreme
Court has decided that an exclusive bargaining representative
has a duty of fair representation under the NIRA (broad enough
to cover both racial and nonracial discrimination), and that judi-
cial relief is available to remedy a breach of such a duty6 - at
least until the question of preemption by the NLRB is properly
presented as an issue to the Court. Humphrey did not resolve the
issue because of the Court's view that the action was in the
nature of an action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement
under section 301. Whether the preemption issue will ever become
a serious issue is dependent upon acceptance of the Miranda
Fuel Co.47 theory to be discussed in the next section of this article.
45. 345 U.S. at 332 n.4.
46. Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 protects the right of a union member to sue. 73 Stat. 522, 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (Supp. V, 1964). It should be noted, however, that this
section reads only as a prohibition on the union, not upon the courts. The
section provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any adminis-
trative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization
or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action
or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to
appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative or legislative pro-
ceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legis-
lator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse
of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or adminis-
trative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof....
On the effect of the proviso, compare Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961), with Mamula
v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d 306 (1964).




Although the conclusion was reached many years ago that an
exclusive bargaining representative under the NLRA owed a
duty of fair representation to employees in the bargaining unit,
the NLRB had never held, prior to the Senate's vote on the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, that racial discrimination by a union consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, the Board did grant
administrative remedies over the years for nonracial discrimina-
tion under its unfair labor practice jurisdiction, and it granted
remedies for both racial and nonracial discrimination under its
jurisdiction to administer representation elections.
(a). Employer Unfair Labor Practice
In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,4 8 decided in 1944 - the same year
that Steele was decided under the Railway Labor Act, a com-
pany and a union which had been established by the company,
negotiated a closed shop agreement, the company having full
knowledge that the union would not admit members of another
union to membership. The other union had been the opposing
union in a representation election. Forty-three members of the
opposing union were discharged by the company pursuant to the
closed shop agreement. The NILRB found that the company had
violated section 8(3) of the NLRA and ordered the company to
reinstate the discharged employees.
No direct administrative relief against the union was granted.
In 1944, the year of this decision, Congress had not yet adopted
the series of union unfair labor practices that appeared three
years later in the Labor Management Relations Act. Neverthe-
less, in upholding the Board's order against the company (which
obviously affected the union that made the closed shop agreement
with the company), the Supreme Court said:
The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the
Act extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own
group members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has
become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility
of representing their interests fairly and impartially. Otherwise, em-
ployees who are not members of a selected union at the time it is
chosen by the majority would be left without adequate representation.
No employee can be deprived of his employment because of his prior
affiliation with any particular union. The Labor Relations Act was
designed to wipe out such discrimination in industrial relations.49
48. 823 U.S. 248.
49. Id. at 255-56.
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The significance of this case is difficult to evaluate. But at
least it should be noted that the Supreme Court permitted the
Board to utilize its unfair labor practice jurisdiction to void
improper nonracial discrimination brought about by an exclusive
bargaining representative, even before the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 was adopted."o
Although the Board ordered affirmative relief in the Wallace
case, running against the company but affecting the union, the
Board might be able to achieve a similar result by denying relief
to a union which seeks an order for a company to bargain with
it. Where a company is committing the unfair labor practice of
refusing to bargain as required by section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA,
the Board might withhold an order to bargain with a union that
is violating its duty of fair representation." So far, the Board
has not utilized this remedy. Furthermore, it probably would
not be an effective remedy against a strong union.
(b). Remedies Under Section 9 of NLRA
Although the Board did not assert that it had any unfair labor
practice jurisdiction over racial discrimination cases between the
date of the Wallace case in 1944 and the vote of the Senate on
the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it did assert the right to take action
under section 9 of the NLRA 2 if a union engaged in racial or
other kinds of discrimination in violation of its duty of fair
representation.
(1). Revocation of Certification
The Board has long been deemed to have substantial discre-
tion under section 9 of the NLRA in the handling of representa-
50. In the same year that Wallace was decided, the Supreme Court of
California held that a union could be enjoined from causing the discharge
of Negroes who were not members of the union. Although there was a closed
shop agreement with the employer, the union refused to admit the Negroes
to membership. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329
(1944). The Wallace and James cases show that individuals received some
protection under the original NLRA against discriminatory conduct by
unions despite the facts that Congress had not provided for union unfair
labor practices in that statute, that a closed shop was lawful, and that in
Steele the Supreme Court had stated that "the ... [Railway Labor Act] does
not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine eligi-
bility to its membership . . . ." 323 U.S. at 204.
51. See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrim-
ination, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 563, 604 (1962).
52. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
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tion elections to determine bargaining representatives. It decides
what is an appropriate bargaining unit and related matters. As
early as 1945, the Board threatened, in the exercise of its discre-
tion in the administration of section 9, to revoke the certification
of a bargaining representative which required Negro employees
in the bargaining unit to continue their membership in a separate,
uncertified local union. In fact, however, the certification was
not revoked because the discriminating union had voluntarily
given up its certification and had requested a new election.5 3
Since 1945 the Board has indicated, in both racial and nonracial
discrimination cases, that it will rescind the certification of a
union for breach of the duty of fair representation." In 1962 it
asserted again that it may rescind the certification of a union
that executes a contract that discriminates on racial grounds."
Nevertheless, the remedy of revocation of a union's certifica-
tion may not be an effective remedy. It obviously does not apply
to the many uncertified unions, and a strong union need not fear
loss of certification. Such a remedy obviously constitutes the
greatest threat to a weak union which may be displaced by
another in a representation election. 6
(2). Contract Bar Rule
In 1962 the NLRB also held that a racially discriminatory
contract will not bar a representation election even though the
53. Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L..B. 1075 (1945).
54. A. 0. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
In the first two cases the union had failed to bargain in behalf of all employees
within the bargaining unit for which it had been certified as representative.
In Hughes Tool the NLRB held that the duty of fair representation imposed
by § 9 required the union to accept and process without partiality all griev-
ances submitted by members of the bargaining unit. Thus it held that the
union's requirement, that nonmembers of the union pay $15 for each grievance
handled and $400 for each case going to arbitration, violated this duty of
fair representation. Although the Board found that this conduct was sufficient
grounds for revocation of the union's certification as bargaining representa-
tive, it gave the union another chance, because it regarded the matter as
one of first impression.
55. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 NL.R.B. 54 (1962). For a discussion of these
remedies, see Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations
Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH CONFRMNCE oN LABoR
3, 6 (1963).
56. Revocation of a union's certification may be disastrous for the union.
At the Hughes Tool Company the certification of the Independent Metal
Workers was revoked on July 1, 1964. Local No. 1, Independent Metal Work-
ers, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1295 (July 1, 1964). On August 4, 1964, this union lost
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contract would otherwise bar the election. As stated by the
NLRB,
the Board will not permit its contract-bar rules to be utilized to shield
contracts such as those here involved from the challenge of otherwise
appropriate election petitions. We therefore hold that, where the bar-
gaining representative of employees in an appropriate unit executes
separate contracts, or even a single contract, discriminating between
Negro and white employees on racial lines, the Board will not deem
such contracts as a bar to an election.57
This remedy also constitutes a serious threat only to weak
unions. A strong union would win the election even if it were held.
(3). Refusal To Certify
Another possible remedy under section 9 is for the Board to
refuse to certify a union if it appears probable that the union will
violate its duty of fair representation. Although the Board has
never taken this action, this remedy would be perfectly consistent
with its position that it may revoke a certification or refuse to
apply the contract bar rule under section 9. As stated by Profes-
sor Sovern, "while the Board can not properly take steps merely
to compel unions to admit Negroes, it can properly act to ensure
that it validates as exclusive bargaining representatives only
unions likely to discharge their statutory duties....
(4). Setting Election Aside
The remedy of refusing to certify a union likely to violate its
duty of fair representation would also be consistent with the
Board's position that an election will be set aside under section
9 when the election atmosphere has been improperly tainted by
racial appeals. The Board has held that racial appeals that are
not truthful and germane to the issues constitute a basis for set-
ting an election aside."9 This ruling applies to union conduct as
well as to employer conduct.co Although setting an election aside
a representation election by a vote of 986 to 917. DAmy LAB. REP. No. 182
(Sept. 17, 1964); DAmy LAB. REP. No. 157 (Aug. 12, 1964); Comment, 2
HOUSToN L. REv. 878, 876 n.29 (1965). The Independent Metal Workers now
represent no one.
57. Pioneer Bus Co., supra note 55, at 55.
58. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLum L. REV. 568, 600 (1962).
59. Sewell Mfg. Co., 188 NL.R.B. 66 (1962).
60. Aristocrat Linen Supply Co., 2 LAB. REL. REP. (58 L.R.R.M.) 1216




because of improper racial appeals by a union does not necessarily
involve a question of fair representation, this remedy does further
illustrate the broad discretion which the Board possesses under
section 9.
(c). Union Unfair Labor Practice
The two key decisions of the NLRB dealing with the question
as to whether breach of a union's duty of fair representation is
a union unfair labor practice under the NLRA are Miranda Fuel
Co."x and Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.) .6
Miranda Fuel involved nonracial discrimination, while Hughes
Tool involved racial discrimination. The Miranda Fuel decision
was rendered almost two years before the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was adopted. Hughes Tool was issued after the Senate had
voted on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several commentators
suggested the possibility of holding a union liable for an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA where it breached its duty of
fair representation. No serious attention was given to the dis-
tinction between the racial and nonracial discrimination cases
on the ground of potential conflict with other statutes. Of course,
at that time, there was no possibility of conflict between the ac-
tion of the Board and action by an administrative body or court
under a broad federal civil rights act.
In 1957, long before the Miranda Fuel decision in 1962, Pro-
fessor Cox (now Solicitor General) posed the arguments pro and
con for holding that a union violates section 8(b) (3) of the NLRA
when it breaches its duty of fair representation.63 That section, read
in conjunction with section 8(d) of the NLRA, makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith with the employer. Cox concluded that the union's
duty to bargain collectively in good faith with the employer may
be construed as imposing a duty on the union also to bargain
61. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962); see Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement
and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052, 1069 (1963); Note,
Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: The Miranda
Case, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1964).
62. 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (July 1, 1964), 45 B.UL. REv. 141 (1965), 50
CoRNELL L.Q. 321 (1965), 78 HARV. L. REv. 679 (1965), 39 N.Y.UJL. REv. 1110
(1964), 43 TXAS L. REV. 108 (1964), 50 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1964); see CoD1-
ment, Racial Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 65 CoLum.
L. REv. 273 (1965); Comment, Unfair Representation as an Unfair Labor Prac-
tice, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1081 (1965).
63. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VIL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
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fairly on behalf of all the employees in the bargaining unit."
In 1962, but still prior to the Miranda Fuel decision of that
year, Professor Sovern published an extensive article on racial
discrimination under the NLRA." Although he did not agree
that the union's duty to bargain collectively with the employer
embraced a duty to represent the employees fairly, he did urge
the Board to explore the possibility of finding an unfair labor
practice for breach of a union's duty of fair representation. He
suggested, through a series of analyses, the possibility of finding
violations of sections 8(b)(1)66 and 8(b)(2) 67 of the NLRA when
Negroes were the victims of certain racially discriminatory prac-
tices by unions.
(1). Miranda Fuel Case
On December 19, 1962, the NLRB issued its famous decision
in the Miranda Fuel Co. case. Finding that the duty of fair repre-
64. Id. at 173-74.
65. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 CoLAL. L. Rnv. 563 (1962).
66. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1958):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents -
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership there-
in....
Section 157 (§ 7 of the NLEA), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958), provides:
SEc. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
67. Added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
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sentation falls within its unfair labor practice jurisdiction, the
majority concluded that the union had violated sections 8(b) (1) (A)
and 8(b) (2) of the NLRA.
The contract between the company and union in this case
contained the following seniority provision:
Section 8. It is further understood and agreed upon that during the
dull season of the year, preference shall be given to the fuel oil chauf-
feurs on the seniority list, and that the Shop Steward shall be the No.
I fuel oil chauffeur on the list.
During the slack season, April 15 to October 15, any employee who
according to seniority would not have steady employment shall be en-
titled to a leave of absence and maintain his full seniority rights during
that period. Any man so described must report to the Shop Steward
not later than 8:00 a.m. on October 15 and sign the seniority roster
in order to protect his seniority, and the Employer agrees to accept
the certification of said Shop Steward as to the availability of such
men when called by the Employer. . .. Any man failing to report as
above specified shall forfeit all seniority rights.P
Lopuch, a truck driver with about nine years of seniority, was
eleventh on a seniority list of 21. In order to spend the summer
in Ohio on family business, Lopuch obtained permission from
the company to leave at the close of business on Friday, April
12, 1957. Although he advised the company that he would return
by October 12, due to illness he did not return to work until
October 80. Because of his late return the union, under pressure
from other employees in the bargaining unit, demanded that
Lopuch's name be placed at the bottom of the seniority list. On
learning of Lopuch's illness, the union accepted this reason as a
valid basis for late return and abandoned its position that Lo-
puch's seniority be forfeited for late return. Nevertheless, still
desiring to place Lopuch at the bottom of the seniority list
(thereby providing greater job protection for those with less
seniority), the union demanded that this action be taken because
of his early departure for his leave of absence. Although the com-
pany had granted permission for Lopuch to leave on April 12,
the company reluctantly agreed to reduce his seniority on the
basis of the union's new position.
It is interesting to consider, assuming that the contract pro-
vided a grievance procedure leading to arbitration, what an arbi-
trator probably would have held if the roles of the parties had
been reversed and the company had tried to reduce Lopuch's
seniority over union objection. In fact, since the union, contrary
to the usual attempt of a union to protect the senior employee,
68. 140 NL.R.B. at 181.
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was working against Lopuch's interests, Lopuch would have had
great difficulty in getting his case before an arbitrator. The Gen-
eral Counsel of the NLRB has taken the position that the
proviso to section 9(a) of the NLRA" creates a right but not a
duty on the part of an employer to process an employee's griev-
ance,70 and the Second Circuit has held that an individual em-
ployee has no standing to compel arbitration unless the contract
clearly provides for prosecution of grievances by individuals. 1
The proviso to section 9(a), the court held, does not give an
individual the right to pursue grievances to arbitration on his
own. Hence, if Lopuch had no remedy before the Board under
the Miranda Fuel theory, it is likely that he had no practical
remedy which he could pursue.?
69. This proviso, as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1958), reads:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bar-
gaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect ....
70. Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 418, 31
L.R.R.M. 1039 (1952); Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel,
Case No. 317, S0 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1952); Administrative Rulings of NLRB
General Counsel, No. SR-2721, 53 LlM.R.M. 1155 (1963). For a different
interpretation of this provision of the statute, see Sherman, The Individual
and His Grievance- Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 PIT. L. REv. 35 (1949).
71. Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179
(9d Cir. 1962). But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 92, 190 A.2d
825, 841 (1963), where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employee
whose union will not handle his grievance may present it himself by a direct
request upon the employer to take it up through the channels established in
the collective bargaining agreement. If the employer refuses to do so, the
employee may force him into arbitration by suit for specific performance of
the collective bargaining agreement. Once the grievance has been pressed to
arbitration, the arbitrator decides who should bear the expense of the pro-
ceeding. If the individual is successful and the grievance is one which the
arbitrator believes should have been handled by the union, costs will be
assessed in accordance with the contract or customary practice. Even if the
individual does not prevail, the court suggests that he should be relieved of
costs if his grievance is colorable, had been asserted in good faith, and the
refusal of the union to handle the case is unfair or arbitrary. On the other
hand, the New Jersey Court indicates that if the arbitrator holds that the
individual has no colorable claim of a substantial nature, the individual must
bear the costs of the proceeding. See Comment, Refusal To Process a Griev-
ance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation: A Plea for Pre-
emption, 26 U. PITT. L. REv. 593 (1965).
72. At least he would have to attempt to have his grievance processed
through the grievance procedure before bringing suit. Republic Steel Corp.
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If the company had reduced Lopuch's seniority over union
objection and the union, desiring to protect the seniority status
of Lopuch as a senior employee, had taken a Lopuch grievance
to arbitration, the arbitrator likely would have ruled in favor of
Lopuch. Although the contract called for forfeiture of seniority
rights for late return from a leave of absence, the arbitrator prob-
ably would find that Lopuch's illness presented a valid reason
for his technical failure to comply with the contract. In any
event, it would be found that the dispute did not turn on Lopuch's
late return to work. With respect to his early departure for his
leave of absence, the company could make the valid argument
that the contract provision requiring it to accept the certifica-
tion of the shop steward applies only to the failure to report back
and not to the early departure, and therefore the certification
of the union, whether or not in favor of Lopuch, is not relevant.73
However, the arbitrator undoubtedly would find that the com-
pany was estopped to reduce Lopuch's seniority on the basis of
early departure because the company had granted him permission
to leave early by a couple of days, which fell on a weekend.
To what extent is the picture changed by the fact that the
union rather than the company was attempting to force Lopuch
to lose his seniority? Lopuch's illness is just as valid an excuse
for his late return, as apparently recognized by the union in the
Miranda Fuel case. The certification provision is just as irrelevant
as where the employer is basing the reduction in seniority on an
early departure. However, the union would not necessarily be
bound by the employer's conduct in granting the early departure.
Of course, it might be relevant to know what the past practice
was, whether the union had advance knowledge of Lopuch's early
v. Maddox, 85 Sup. Ct. 614 (1965). Even then, it is doubtful whether Lopuch,
a truck driver, would have the funds to employ counsel to press his suit -with
the company and the union both arrayed against him.
73. The purpose of the contract provision was noted in the dissent by
Judge Friendly when Miranda was heard by the Second Circuit, 326 F.2d
172, 182 n.4 (1963):
What the clause said in readily understandable English was that a
driver whose position would give him only occasional work during the
slack season did not have to hang around all summer in order to pre-
serve his seniority . . . its purpose was to help junior workers, not to
harm senior ones. Nothing gave the slightest warrant for supposing
that it prevented the employer from treating an older employee like
Lopuch as decent human relations dictated....
Since Lopuch might have had steady employment during the slack season,
it could be argued that the contract provision did not apply to his case. If
that premise is adopted, neither company nor union could argue that Lopuch's
seniority should be forfeited on the basis of this contract provision.
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departure, and whether it had raised any objection. Nevertheless,
the contractual basis for the union's position is not established.
In any event, the fact that the union abandoned its real basis
for its attempt to reduce Lopuch's seniority (his late return) and
switched to a less tenable position under the contract language
would weigh heavily against the union if Lopuch could ever get
his case before an arbitrator.
Since Lopuch probably could not get his case to arbitration
and since the union was taking an arbitrary position against his
interests, Lopuch went to the NLRB. In 1959 the Board rendered
its first decision in this case.74 It held that the union had violated
section 8(b) (2) and that the company had violated section
8(a) (3) of the statute. The Board held that the employer's delega-
tion to the union of the right to determine seniority resulted in
a per se violation of the statute. However, after the Supreme
Court indicated in 1961 in another case" that the per se approach
to such matters was improper, the Miranda Fuel case, on appeal
from the enforcement order of the Second Circuit, was remanded
to the Board for reconsideration."
In 1962 the Board rendered the decision for which the case
is famous. A three-member majority (Leedom, Rodgers and
Brown) concluded that sections 8(b) (1)77 and 8(b) (2)7" of the
NLRA had been violated by the union, and that sections 8(a) (1)7"
and 8(a)(3)80 had been violated by the company. The following
quotation summarizes the position of the majority with respect
to section 8(b)(1):
[W]e are of the opinion that Section 7 thus gives the employees the
right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their
74. 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959), enforced, 284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960). The
Board's order was to restore Lopuch to his former position on the seniority
roster - with back pay.
75. Local 857, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
76. Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 866 U.S. 763 (1961).
77. Quoted in note 66 supra.
78. Quoted in note 67 supra; see Comment, Discrimination and the NLRB:
The Scope of Board Power Under Sections 8(aXS) and 8(bX2), 32 U. CI.
L. REV. 124 (1964).
79. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1958): "(a) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . ." Sec-
tion 157 is quoted in note 66 supra.
80. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. V,
1964): "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-. . . (3)
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . ."
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exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment. This
right of employees is a statutory limitation on statutory bargaining
representatives, and we conclude that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory
representative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon
considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious or un-
fair. . . .81
Since under section 7 employees are entitled to bargain through
representatives of their own choosing, a corollary right of the
employees is to have fair representation. They are entitled to be
free of "unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment" by the union.
If a union engages in such conduct, it violates its duty of fair
representation under section 9 and the right of the employees
under section 7. Thus the union has violated section 8(b) (1) (A),
which prohibits restraint or coercion of employees' rights under
section 7 by unions. And if the employer participates, he violates
section 8(a) (1) which prohibits employer restraint or coercion
of employees' rights under section 7 .2
The majority of the Board also found that the union had
violated section 8(b) (2) on the ground that the reduction of
Lopuch's seniority had the foreseeable result of encouraging
union membership, and that the arbitrary action of the union
was in violation of the contract between the parties. 3 Since the
employer participated, he was deemed to be in violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(3) -the employer unfair labor practice section which
is the counterpart of the union unfair labor practice under section
8(b) (2).
On appeal the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board's order; 4 but the court split three ways, and cannot be
said to have rejected the Board's theory under section 8(b) (1).
Only Judge Medina rejected this theory. He said that "discrimina-
tion for reasons wholly unrelated to 'union membership, loyalty,
the acknowledgment of union authority, or the performance of
union obligations,' is not sufficient to support findings of viola-
tions of Sections 8(a)(3), 8(a)(1), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the
act . . . ."" Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Friendly found it
81. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
82. The theory that § 7 ought to be construed in the light of § 9(a) was
advanced in a somewhat different context in Sherman, supra note 70.
83. When Miranda was before the Second Circuit in the earlier case, the
court agreed that the union's action was "in conflict with the agreement."
284 F.2d at 863.
84. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (1963).
85. Id. at 175. This view was also the view of McCulloch and Fanning,
the Board members who dissented. 140 N.L.R.B. at 191.
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unnecessary to pass on the Board's theory under section
8 (b) (1) (A) ."
Judge Friendly, recognizing that Lopuch was a member of
the union, nevertheless felt that the union's conduct had the effect
of encouraging membership in the union in violation of section
8(b) (2).117 If Lopuch had not been a union member, the union's
conduct would seem to have encouraged membership in the
union in violation of the NLRA. Should Lopuch be worse off
because he was a union member? As a result of the union's action,
Lopuch would justifiably feel that he ought to become a "good"
union member, in the good graces of the shop steward.
Commentators who have written extensively in this field have
approved the basic position taken by the majority of the NLRB
in the Miranda Fuel case under section 8(b) (1) of the NLRA."5
Nevertheless, the Board did not appeal from the split decision
of the Second Circuit in this case, and in other cases the Supreme
Court has left the question open.8" There is no clear congressional
intent to resolve the question. To the possible argument that
Congress did not affirmatively indicate an intent to make viola-
tion of the duty of fair representation an unfair labor practice,
it may be pointed out that Congress did not clearly manifest an
intent to create such a duty under the Railway Labor Act or
under section 9 of the NLRA. But such a duty has been found,0o
and the Board could properly find a correlative right of the indi-
vidual under section 7 of the NLRA.
86. Chief Judge Lumbard concurred with Judge Medina, but upon the
ground that he believed the evidence failed to support the conclusion of the
NLRB that the union had taken "'hostile action, for irrelevant, unfair or
invidious reasons' against Lopuch." 326 F.2d at 180. Judge Friendly would
have enforced the Board's order under §§ 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3). Ibid.
87. Id. at 183.
88. Blumrosen, Duty of Fair Representation: Individual Rights Under
Collective Contracts-What Should the Rule Be?, 15 LAB. L.J. 598 (1964);
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mica. L. REv. 1435
(1963); Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act:
The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3
(1963). The view of the majority of the Board is consistent with Cox's pre-
Miranda position that breach of the duty of fair representation should be an
unfair labor practice. See Cox, supra note 63, at 172-74.
89. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 85 Sup. Ct. 614 (1965); Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
90. The Supreme Court has said that the duty of fair representation




(2). Hughes Tool Case
In the spring of 1964 Congress was wrestling with the matter
of proper procedures to implement the policy declarations of the
Civil Rights Act. After the "leadership compromise" 91 was
reached and after the Senate had voted on the bill, the NLRB
issued its decision in the Hughes Tool case" in the summer of
1964.
In this case Locals 1 and 2 of the Independent Metal Workers
Union had been certified as joint bargaining representatives, local
1 consisting of white employees and local 2 consisting of Negro
employees. Under the contract between the company and the
unions, group I jobs were open only to white employees, and
group II jobs were open only to Negroes. Separate lines of pro-
gression and demotion prevented transfer from one group to the
other. In 1961 local 2 sought to eliminate racial discrimination
in the new contract. Over the objection of local 2, local 1 and the
company extended the old contract. At the same time local 1 and
the company agreed upon the creation of new apprenticeships.
When they were posted for bids, Davis, a Negro employee and
treasurer of local 2, bid for an apprenticeship. The company re-
fused to consider him as an applicant despite the protest of
local 2's grievance committee. Local 1 ignored his request to
intercede on his behalf. An unfair labor practice charge was filed
under section 8(b) (1), and local 2 filed a motion to have the 1961
certification revoked. The two cases were consolidated.
Applying its Miranda Fuel theory, the majority of the Board 3
found violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) as a result
of local I's refusal to handle Davis' grievance on the ground of
race. The majority of the Board, going beyond the Miranda Fuel
reasoning, also found a violation of section 8(b) (3). It decided
that the union's duty to bargain in good faith is owed to the
employees as well as to the employer. Although the majority did
not find that refusal of local 1 to admit Negroes to membership
was an unfair labor practice (since this matter was not put in
issue by the unfair labor practice charge), the majority warned
that this position should not be construed as disagreeing with
the contention that racial segregation in membership could be
91. This is explained infra in part III of this article.
92. 56 L.R.R.M. 1989 (July 1, 1964).
93. The majority consisted of Leedom and Brown, and Jenkins, who had
succeeded Rodgers. It was found that local 1 was responsible for matters
involving apprenticeships.
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an unfair labor practice."
In revoking the joint certification of the two local unions
under section 9, the Board relied on the fact that the contracts
were executed and administered by the unions in a racially dis-
criminatory manner. Of greater significance, however, is the fact
that the majority of the Board concluded that the certification
should be rescinded because locals 1 and 2 discriminated on the
basis of race in determining eligibility for membership in the
unions.95 In this respect the majority overruled prior cases" to
the extent that they permitted unions which exclude employees
from membership on racial grounds, or which classify or segregate
members on racial grounds, to obtain or retain certification under
section 9.
Moreover, in the event that the Regional Director were to be
asked to certify representatives at this plant in the future, the
majority of the Board indicated approval of a requirement that
the following type of notice be posted:
This labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as the bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit described below. The certification is conditioned upon our not
discriminating against any employee because of his race or color, both
with respect to membership in this labor organization on terms fully
equal to those afforded any member and with respect to terms and
conditions of employment and opportunities for advancement under
any contract we may negotiate with management. Any person who
believes that this labor organization is not observing a policy of non-
discrimination should bring the matter to the attention of the National
Labor Relations Board ... .7
Since the Hughes Tool decision, the Board has had occasion
to apply its theory to several other cases. In one of these cases,
Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,"8 the union was main-
taining racially segregated local unions, its contracts provided
for the division of work between the locals on a 75-25 percent
94. 56 L.R.R.M. at 1993.
95. Id. at 1294.
96. E.g., Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945); Atlanta Oak
Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 978 (1945).
97. 56 L.R.R.L at 1294 n.*. McCulloch and Fanning, who concurred in
part and dissented in part, did not pass on this and several other issues. They
agreed that the certification should be rescinded because of the discriminatory
contract. They agreed also that there was a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), but on
the narrow ground that local I had refused to process Davis' grievance be-
cause of his nonmembership in local 1. They dissented from the findings that
§§ 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) had been violated.
98. 2 LAB. REL. RP. (57 L.R.R.M.) 1083 (Sept. 11, 1964).
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basis, and white and Negro gangs were prevented from working
side by side in the same hatch. Finding that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation, the majority of the
Board concluded that the union had violated sections 8(b) (1) (A),
8(b) (2), and 8(b) (3) of the NLRA. The case is significant for the
following elaboration of the majority's reasoning under section
8 (b) (3):
Because collective-bargaining agreements which discriminate invidi-
ously are not lawful under the Act, the good-faith requirements of
Section 8(d) necessarily protect employees from infringement of their
rights; and both unions and employers are enjoined by the Act from
entering into contractual terms which offend such rights. . . . Section
8(d) cannot mean that a union can be exercising good faith toward an
employer while simultaneously acting in bad faith toward employees
in regard to the same matters.... We conclude that when a statutory
representative negotiates a contract in breach of the duty which it
owes to employees to represent all of them fairly and without invidious
discrimination, the representative cannot be said to have negotiated the
sort of agreement envisioned by Section 8(d) nor to have bargained
in good faith as to the employees whom it represents or toward the
employer ... .9
Of course, under the Hughes Tool theory it is possible for a
Negro majority to discriminate against a white minority and
thus breach the duty of fair representation. In one recent case
Member Leedom of the NLRB thought that the union had vio-
lated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by discriminating against
white employees. 00
By extending the Miranda Fuel doctrine to cover racial dis-
crimination cases during the year between the adoption and the
effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Board has laid the foundation for conflict during the period after
99. Id. at 1085-86. (Footnotes omitted.)
100. International Union, United Automobile Workers, 2 LAB. REL. REP.
(57 L.R.R.M.) 1298 (Nov. 6, 1964). Two other members of the panel found
statutory violations on other grounds. The panel agreed that $§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) were violated by the employer. Another application of the Hughes
Tool theory resulted in an order that racial discrimination cease in a plant
wherein the management had agreed under a government contract to prevent
such practices. Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (57
L.R.R.M.) 1535 (Dec. 16, 1964). Cf. Theo Hamm Brewing Co., 2 LAB. REL.
REP. (58 L.R.R.M.) 1418 (March 3, 1965), where the Board held that the
discharge of an employee who had refused to join a racially segregated union
was not a violation of the duty of fair representation since the direct cause
of discharge was an unsatisfactory work performance, and since the evidence
was insufficient to show that the union attempted to cause his discharge for
unlawful reasons.
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the key provisions of title VII become effective on July 2, 1965.
An examination of the provisions of title VII, as they apply to
unions, is now in order.
II. APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO
UNION ACTIVITIES
A. UNLwFu EMPLOYMENT PRCTICES OF UNIONS
The provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
apply to unions, as well as to employers and employment agen-
cies. These provisions are designed to prevent the numerous
devices employed by some unions to restrict Negro employment
opportunities. Some unions have excluded Negroes from mem-
bership by racial bars in their constitutions, or by having the
AFL organize the Negroes in a "federal local" attached to the
AFL rather than to the discriminating national union, or by
establishing auxiliary Negro locals subordinate to the parent
local for white members, or by relatively equal but segregated
local unions. Job opportunities have been controlled indirectly
by these devices and by the operation of job referral plans, ap-
prenticeship and other training programs, and through racially
discriminatory seniority arrangements. Racial discrimination has
been practiced by some unions, both in the negotiation of col-
lective bargaining agreements and in the administration of the
agreements.' 0
The Civil Rights Act condemns such practices by making it
an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization:
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an individual in violation of this section.' 02
Other provisions specifically make it an unlawful employment
practice for a union to discriminate on the basis of race, color,
101. See NORGREN & HIL, TowARD FAm EMPLOYMENT (1964). Chapter
3, "Union Racial Practices," describes the formal and informal devices em-
ployed by some unions to limit Negro employment opportunities.
102. Section 703(c), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
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religion, sex, or national origin in determining admission to an
apprenticeship or other kind of training program, or in the opera-
tion of such programs.103 Advertising that indicates a preference
or limitation, based on such factors, for membership in the union
or for referral for employment is an unlawful employment prac-
tice for a labor organization."o' A union also commits an unlawful
employment practice if it discriminates against an individual
because he has invoked the provisions of title VII.2o5
Although there are some limited exceptions to the unlawful
employment practices,'06 the broad sweep of the unlawful employ-
ment practice provisions should be noted' Not only is discrim-
ination based on race prohibited, but also discrimination based
on religion, sex, or national origin. Nevertheless, a union is not re-
quired to grant preferential treatment to any individual to correct
an existing imbalance (in terms of number or percentage of per-
sons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) in member-
ship, employment or training programs 08
The unlawful employment practice provisions are so broad
that they may be construed to cover all instances of racial dis-
crimination in union membership and employment that Congress
can reach under the commerce power. 09 They would have cov-
ered all cases where the NLRB has found that racial discrimina-
tion by a union constituted an unfair labor practice, if the key
provisions of title VII had been in effect when these cases were
decided by the NLRB. The overlap of title VII and the Board's
application of the Miranda Fuel theory to racial discrimination
practices of unions is obvious. Actually, the title VII prohibitions
go beyond the holdings of the Board to the extent that they ban
103. Section 703(d), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. I 2000e-2(d) (1964).
104. Section 704(b), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (1964).
105. Section 704(a), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. & 2000e-3(a) (1964).
106. Exceptions are made for situations where religion, sex, or national
origin (but by negative implication, not race) is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1964); where the
applicant for employment is a member of the Communist Party or of an
organization required by the Subversive Activities Control Board to register
as a Communist front, § 708 (f), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. & 2000e-2(f) (1964);
or where the applicant has not obtained the clearance required by any federal
security program, § 703(g), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2(g) (1964).
107. Sections 703(a) and 703(b) cover unlawful discrimination in "terms
and conditions" of employment. Such facilities as drinking fountains, lunch
rooms and rest rooms would seem to be covered.
108. Section 703(j), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
109. A similar observation was made in Address by Professor William P.
Murphy, 1964 Midwest Labor Conference, Ohio State University, Dec. 11,
1964, on file in University of Minnesota Law Library.
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discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin. Although
title VII does not call for union action to correct racial imbalances
due to prior practices, the NLRB apparently would not require
a union to take affirmative steps simply to correct such an
imbalance.
B. BROAD COVERAGE OF LABOR UNIONS
The definition of a labor organization subject to the coverage
of title VII is very broad."o The definition is similar to that found
in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959,"1 except that the latter statute excludes a "state or local
central body." No such exception is made in title VII, which
covers international and national unions, conferences, boards,
committees and councils subordinate to them, unaffiliated unions,
employee representation plans, etc. Title VII applies to unions
which are covered by the Railway Labor Act, as well as those
covered by the National Labor Relations Act. Although the labor
organization must be engaged in an industry affecting commerce,
the term "industry affecting commerce" includes any activity or
industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959."' A labor
organization is deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting
commerce if (1) it operates a hiring hall to procure employees
for an employer or job opportunities for employees, or (2) it has
25 members (when title VII becomes fully effective),xis and it is
certified under the National Labor Relations Act or Railway
110. Section 701(d), 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(d) (1964):
(d) The term "labor organization" means a labor organization
engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an
organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or
employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so
engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or
conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint
or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a
national or international labor organization.
111. 73 Stat. 520, 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (Supp. V, 1964).
112. Section 701(h), 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(h) (1964).
113. Section 701(e), 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(e) (1964), specifies
100 members during the first year after title VII becomes effective, 75 mem-
bers during the second year, 50 during the third, and 25 thereafter. Where a
labor organization is composed of constituent organizations, the aggregate
number of members is counted.
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Labor Act or is acting as bargaining representative in an industry
affecting commerce." 4 Because of the latter alternative there is
no requirement that the union be certified under the National
Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act. Moreover, a
parent organization or a subordinate organization of such bar-
gaining representative is covered by this provision.
C. ADMINsTRATIoN AND ENFORCEMNT OF TITLE VII
The administrative and enforcement machinery for imple-
menting title VII is applicable to unlawful employment practices
of unions, employers, and employment agencies. Although an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is created by title
VII, the statute places great stress on the use of state fair em-
ployment practice machinery and on the use of mediation."'
The legislative history regarding the administrative and en-
forcement machinery is significant. Without the compromise
that was eventually reached, particularly by the leaders of the
Senate in the late spring of 1964, it is likely that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 never would have been adopted by
Congress. The extensive legislative history concerning the funda-
mental changes which were made in the method of enforcement of
title VII is neatly summarized by the following:
The administration and enforcement provisions of Title VII as
finally passed bear little or no resemblance to those originally con-
templated by the sponsors of the legislation. Two complete metamor-
phoses were effected as the bill moved from the House Judiciary
Subcommittee to the full Committee and the floor of the House, and
as it emerged from the Senate and finally was adopted. The result is
enforcement machinery that relies in substantial part on getting volun-
tary compliance through persuasion and conciliation.
Title VII of H.R. 7152 . . . called for an administrative agency
that would have worked very much the way the National Labor Rela-
tions Board does. It provided for the usual complaint, notice of hear-
ing and hearing, and cease and desist order reviewable in a federal
court of appeals ....
The House Judiciary Committee, however, changed all of this, and
the House went along with these changes. The House bill contemplated
enforcement by means of a de novo court proceeding initiated by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ....
In the Senate this approach, too, was abandoned and a fundamen-
tally new line taken. The Dirksen-Mansfield version, which ulti-
114. Ibid. Of course, a labor organization is covered by the statute
where it qualifies as an employer within the statutory definition.
115. E.g., § 706(b)-(d), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b)-(d) (1964).
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mately became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, largely abandoned the
philosophy of government-initiated enforcement (absent a "pattern or
practice of resistance") and turned instead to essentially private en-
forcement.11
Under title VII a person claiming to be aggrieved, or a mem-
ber of the Commission, may file a charge with the Commission,
alleging that a labor organization has engaged in an unlawful
employment practice."7 However, where the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurs in a state which has a law prohibiting
such practice, the aggrieved individual may not file a charge with
the Commission until 60 days after proceedings have been com-
menced under state law (unless the state proceedings have ter-
minated earlier). Where a member of the Commission files a
charge in a state prohibiting the activity, the Commission must
give the state a similar opportunity to take action before the
Commission proceeds." 9 After the period for state action expires
(where an opportunity for state action is required), the Commis-
sion has 30 days to secure voluntary compliance by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 20 In states
where there is no law prohibiting the activity, the Commission
has 30 days from the filing of the charge to secure voluntary
compliance.
If state action (where required) has not remedied the unlawful
employment practice and the Commission has been unable to
obtain voluntary compliance within its 80 day period, the Com-
mission must notify the aggrieved person and
a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against
the respondent named in the charge (1) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved, or (2) if such charge was filed by a member of the Com-
116. BuREAu OF NATIONAL ArrAms, TnE CIVIL RIGHTs AcT OF 1964, at
41 (1964).
117. Section 706(a), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
118. Section 706(b), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1964). The
valid observation has been made that where an aggrieved individual is not
a party to the proceeding, "neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel effect
should be given to the proceedings instituted by the state enforcement
authority'. . . ." Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684,
694 (1965); cf. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROoKLYN . REV. 62, 84 (1964).
119. Section 706(c), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (1964). For
a series of articles on the role of state and local government in working toward
equal opportunity in employment, see 14 BuFFALO L. REV. 1-198 (1964).




mission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the
alleged unlawful employment practice.'21
Such action, it should be noted, must be brought by the aggrieved
and not by a member of the Commission. Title VII provides that
the action should be brought in federal district court, that the
court may appoint an attorney for the complainant, and that the
court may authorize the commencement of the action without
payment of fees, costs, or security.m2
The Civil Rights Act does not establish a fund for the payment
of counsel for indigent complainants, as the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 does for counsel for indigent defendants charged with
felonies or misdemeanors.2 Prior to enactment of the Criminal
Justice Act, a federal district court held that a court-appointed
attorney was entitled to just compensation for his services from
the United States Government.124 Since the attorney, appointed
by the court to represent an indigent defendant who was seeking
vacation of a judgment of conviction, had been directed to use
his legal learning, enterprise, and office facilities, the court held
that this was a "taking" of compensable property within the
meaning of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. Hence the
court awarded him just compensation for his services. Although
subsequent adoption of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 under-
mined the significance of this case for counsel for indigent de-
fendants in criminal cases, the reasoning of the court was broad
enough to be applicable to attorneys appointed as counsel for
complainants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It
should be noted that the court in fact treated counsel in that
case as counsel for an indigent plaintiff, presumably because he
was seeking vacation of a judgment.
Where suit is brought by an aggrieved individual under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and the court appoints counsel, it
might be argued that the attorney's services have not been taken
121. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). It
would appear that the suit could be maintained regardless of whether the
Commission believes that unlawful discrimination has occurred. Yet in view
of the structure of title VII, and notwithstanding a contrary statement by
Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REc. 18694 (daily ed. June 17, 1964), it would
seem that the aggrieved individual must first proceed with the Commission.
See Berg, supra note 118, at 88.
122. Section 706(e), (f), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 200Oe-5(e), (f) (1964).
123. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C.A. § 8006A (Supp. 1964).
124. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), 49 MiN.
L. REv. 553 (1965).
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for a public use. However, the public interest in civil rights is
clearly established by the statute itself, by numerous Supreme
Court decisions, and by the fact that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is authorized to institute proceedings to
compel compliance with an order of a court against an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization.125
In any event, the issue will arise only if court-appointed coun-
sel for the complainant is not otherwise compensated. Title VII
permits the court to "allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person."' 20 Thus, court-
appointed counsel for an indigent Negro in a race discrimination
case may obtain compensation from the respondent if the court-
appointed counsel prevails in his case. If he fails, the court theo-
retically could require the Negro to pay a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing respondent. It is submitted, however, that
such a ruling is not likely in actual practice. Furthermore, since
the Negro in the hypothetical example is an indigent, he would
not be able to pay the attorney's fee.
Although title VII does not authorize the Commission to
institute the original civil action based upon the charge before it,
the court may permit the Attorney General to intervene in the
aggrieved individual's suit if the Attorney General certifies that
the case is of general public importance. 2 7 And the Attorney
General may bring a civil action in a federal district court if he
has reasonable cause to believe that respondent is engaged in a
"pattern or practice of resistance" to the enjoyment of rights
guaranteed by title VII.12 8 When the individual brings suit, the
court may enjoin continuation of the unlawful employment prac-
tice and "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency,
or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice) ."129 It would appear that the
court could grant the same kind of relief in a suit by the Attorney
General. It is also interesting to note that the statutory language
covering the relief which a court might grant is essentially the
125. Section 706(i), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(i) (1964).
126. Section 706(k), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k) (1964).
127. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
128. Section 707(a), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
129. Section 706(g), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
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same as that in the National Labor Relations Act which covers
the relief which the NLRB might grant for an unfair labor
practice.x0
III. ACCOMMODATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES
A. OVERLAP OF FEDERAL STATUTES AND THEORY OF Accoayvo-
DATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is clearly designed
to apply to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin as it crops up in labor disputes.31 Likewise, an
overlap clearly exists between rights which individuals might
assert under this statute and rights which individuals might assert
under such federal labor statutes as the Railway Labor Act and
the National Labor Relations Act. Yet title VII of the Civil
Rights Act is silent as to the manner in which the administration
of these statutes should be accommodated.
The best method of accommodating the administration of the
Civil Rights Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the National Labor
Relations Act is that method which involves the least amount
of conflict, yet pays proper deference to previously established
law and to newly created rights. It is possible, in light of both
theoretical and practical considerations, to avoid undue conflict,
and to give due weight to previously established law under the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act and
to newly established rights and remedies under the Civil Rights
Act by holding that the newly established rights and remedies
under the Civil Rights Act do not displace those rights and
180. Section 10(c), as amended, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1958), provides that the Board, upon its finding that a person has engaged
in an unfair labor practice,
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act:
Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee,
back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the
case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him . ...
131. Further evidence that title VII is applicable to labor disputes is
the fact that it is specifically provided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.
72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958), which in general prohibits the issuance
of injunctions against peaceful activities in labor disputes, does not apply to
civil actions brought under title VII. Section 706(h), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(h) (1964). If title VII did not cover "labor disputes," there would
be no need for this provision.
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remedies established by the courts and the NLRB prior to the
"leadership compromise" in the Senate in the late spring of 1964
and the vote of the Senate on the Civil Rights Act on June 19,
1964. On the other hand, since June 19, 1964, the NLRB has
extended rights and remedies under the National Labor Relations
Act in areas clearly covered by title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
and such extension has created the potential for undue conflict
in the administration of these statutes. Such extension should not
be countenanced by the Supreme Court. The balance of part III
of this article will be devoted to an examination and application
of these principles.
The extension of remedies for racial discrimination under the
National Labor Relations Act between June 19, 1964 (the date
of the Senate vote on the Civil Rights Act), and July 2, 1965 (the
effective date of the key provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act), obviously creates no immediate conflict during the period
when rights may not be asserted under title VII. The conflict
will arise after July 2, 1965. Hence, it is the period after that
date with which this article is concerned.
Under the statutory construction advocated in this article,
the Supreme Court's decision in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 32
is still good law. The same is true of other decisions of the Supreme
Court involving racial discrimination under the Railway Labor
Act. Decisions involving nonracial discrimination under that
statute are still good law, also. Decisions under the National
Labor Relations Act present further problems, but there is no
need to overrule any of the Supreme Court decisions under the
NLRA. The theory of the majority of the NLRB in the 1962
Miranda Fuel Co. decision,t s that breach of the union's duty of
fair representation is an unfair labor practice, should be sustained
in discrimination cases not covered by title VII. To the extent
that the Board subsequently extended this theory, on July 1,
1964, in the Hughes Tool Co. case"' and in later cases, to apply
to racial discrimination, the Board's position should not be sus-
tained - at least not after July 2, 1965. On the other hand, the
Board may continue to invoke remedies under Section 9 of the
NLRA in both racial and nonracial discrimination cases. 35
132. 393 U.S. 192 (1944); see notes 7-14 supra and accompanying text.
133. 140 N.L.R.B. 181; see notes 61-90 supra and accompanying text.
134. 56 L.R.R.M. 1289; see notes 91-100 supra and accompanying text.
135. Of course, there is nothing in title VII which would preclude the
processing of grievances to arbitration under the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement which prohibited racial discrimination. Arbitrators have
sustained such grievances. E.g., Armco Steel Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 683 (1964)
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B. EvALuATON or ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS
Arguably all remedies for racial discrimination under the Rail-
way Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act are pre-
empted by the Civil Rights Act. Congress thought it important
to insert an explicit provision in title VII to the effect that no
person is relieved of any liability, duty, or penalty for violation
of a state law,"' but it failed to insert a similar provision to
preserve remedies under other federal statutes.3  Hence it may
be contended that Congress by implication displaced existing
remedies under the federal labor statutes. Only by such preemp-
tion could the danger of interference with national policy as
(Herbert L. Sherman, Jr.). But this device is no remedy against a union
that is discriminating.
136. Section 708, 78 Stat. 269, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-7 (1964).
Moreover, in title XI Congress stated:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indi-
cating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which
any such title operates to the exclusion of state laws on the same
subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as
invalidating any provision of state law unless such provision is incon-
sistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1104, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h-4 (1964).
137. Congress did provide, however, that title VII was not to be con-
strued as affecting veterans' rights under any federal or state or local law.
Section 712, 78 Stat. 265, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-11 (1964). Thus, it could be
said that when Congress intended to protect rights under other federal stat-
utes, it made express provisions for them.
In title XII Congress adopted the provision that: "Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any right or authority
,of the Attorney General or of the United States or any agency or officer
thereof under existing law to institute or intervene in any action or proceed-
ing." Section 1103, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h-3 (1964). The language
,of this provision does not preserve the right of an individual to institute an
action or proceeding in federal district court under the Railway Labor Act
or the Natonal Labor Relations Act to correct racial discrimination by a
union, since the provision refers to the right of a government officer or
agency to institute an action or intervene in an action. Nor does the provision
preserve any right of an individual to institute an action before the NLRB
to correct racial discrimination by a union. Although the provision refers to
the right of an agency or officer under existing law to institute an action, it
should be noted that under existing law neither the NLRB nor the General
'Counsel initiates unfair labor practice charges, or actions under § 9 of the
National Labor Relations Act. Even if the language of § 1103 is deemed to
be applicable to the procedure of instituting an action before the NLRB, it
does not answer the substantive question whether relief is available, or what
kind of relief is available, from the NLRB for breach of the duty of fair
representation. The language of this provision should be contrasted with that
of § 708 which preserves liabilities, duties, and penalties under state law.
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expressed by title VII of the Civil Rights Act be averted. Such
reasoning would be consistent with the Supreme Court's numer-
ous rulings in other situations that state and federal courts must
defer to the NLRB where an activity is arguably an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA.
On the other hand, it may be asserted that it would be odd
indeed to hold that, with no express provision on the point, Con-
gress had impliedly wiped out long established remedies for
racial discrimination by adopting a statute which is designed to
provide benefits for victims of racial discrimination. Furthermore,
if the Railway Labor Act is not construed as imposing a duty of
fair representation on exclusive bargaining agents (which is
violated by making invidious distinctions in the negotiation and
administration of a collective agreement), then it may be argued
that this statute is unconstitutional. In the Steele case the Court
said:
If, as the state court has held, the [Railway Labor] Act confers
this power [to discriminate on racial grounds] on the bargaining repre-
sentative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate
statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. For
the representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature
which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny,
restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom
it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty
equally to protect those rights. . . .3a
A similar argument may be made under the National Labor
Relations Act. But to this argument under either the Railway
Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act, it may be said
that the Civil Rights Act provides the duty not to discriminate
on racial grounds and thus the constitutional question is avoided.
Hence the argument for preemption by title VII is still valid.
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that not only
may well established remedies for racial discrimination be con-
tinued, but that new remedies may be developed under the federal
labor statutes just as if title VII had never been adopted. To
support this position, the Senate's rejection of an amendment
proposed by Senator Tower might be cited. This amendment,
offered on June 12, 1964, proposed that:
The provisions of . . . [title VII] shall constitute the exclusive means
whereby any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive
branch of the Government, or any independent agency of the United
States, may grant or seek relief from, or pursue any remedy with respect
to, any employment practice of any employer, employment agency,
188. 823 U.S. at 198.
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labor organization, or joint labor-management committee covered by
this title, if such employment practice may be the subject of a charge
or complaint filed under this title.139
Since the Senate rejected this proposed amendment, it may be
argued that the Civil Rights Act can have no effect on possible
rights under such other statutes as the National Labor Relations
Act. The NLRB appears to have adopted this position.4 o But
this argument is not valid when the proposed amendment is con-
sidered in the context of Senator Tower's remarks. In his explana-
tion of the amendment, Senator Tower discussed its purpose only
in terms of potential conflict between the operations of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under title VII and the
rules for federal contractors established by the President's Com-
mittee for Equal Employment Opportunity. Senator Tower made
no reference to the NLRB.x'4 Yet, despite this announced purpose,
Senator Tower's amendment was much broader and far reaching
in its scope." It would have wiped out such established NLRB
remedies as revocation of certification and removal of the con-
tract bar. Whatever weight should be attached to rejection of
Senator Tower's amendment, the effect of the rejection is incon-
clusive. A senator would have voted against the amendment if
he accepted Senator Tower's stated purpose but thought that
the Commission and the President's Committee should coordinate
their efforts through special conferences which the President is
required to convene under the terms of title VII.1* A senator like-
wise would have voted against the amendment if he thought it
too broad, because it would wipe out clearly established remedies
by the NLRB. Rejection of the amendment simply leaves open
the question as to whether an amendment narrowly drawn to
exclude NLRB remedies would have been accepted by a majority.
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act is not as clear
as it is for some statutes. There was no Senate committee report
or hearing record, and no Senate-House conference report. The
speeches, printed in the Congressional Record, are inconclusive,
particularly those statements made concerning remedies prior to
the significant changes in the enforcement machinery. On April
8, 1964, Senator Clark stated that title VII "would not affect
the present operation of any part of the National Labor Relations
139. 110 CONG. REG. 13171 (daily ed. June 12, 1964).
140. Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 2 LAn. REL. REP. (57 L.R.R.M.)
1535, 1539 (Dec. 16, 1964).
141. 110 CONG. REC. 13171-72 (daily ed. June 12, 1964).
142. As noted by Senators Morse and Pastore. Id. at 13172.
143. Section 716(c), 78 Stat. 266, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-15 (1964).
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Act or rights under existing labor laws." 4 4 This remark was made
as a summary of a Department of Justice memorandum (printed
in the Congressional Record), which stated that an individual
could pursue his rights under the Railway Labor Act and the
National Labor Relations Act, that the extent to which the latter
covered racial discrimination was not clear, but that the duties
of unions under these statutes "would continue to be enforced as
they are now." 4  At the time of these remarks the NLRB had
never held that breach of the duty of fair representation by racial
discrimination was a union unfair labor practice. Moreover, at
the time of these remarks the Senate discussion concerning im-
portant changes in the enforcement machinery for title VII had
not taken place." On the other hand, the Senate, the body to
which Senator Clark addressed his remarks, voted on the bill
over 10 days before the NLRB's decision in the Hughes Tool
case was issued. It should not be necessary to add that racial
discrimination by a union was not made an unfair labor practice
under the National Labor Relations Act as a result of enactment
of the Civil Rights Act."'
If reference to legislative history prior to the important Senate
changes in the enforcement machinery is relevant, then it is
worthwhile noting that several bills have been introduced over
the years to make racial discrimination an unfair labor practice
under the jurisdiction of the N-LRB. Such a bill was introduced in
1953.48 The last such bill was an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act, proposed by Senator Prouty.'49 Since Congress has not
adopted such measures, it may be argued that legislative history
shows a congressional intent not to make racial discrimination an
144. 110 CONG. Ruc. 6986 (daily ed.) (Emphasis added).
145. Ibid.
146. On June 4, 1964, almost two months after Senator Clark's remarks,
Senator Humphrey explained the important changes in enforcement machinery.
110 CONG. Rc. 12295 (daily ed.). Senator Dirksen gave his explanation the
following day. 110 CONG. REc. 12381, 12383 (daily ed. June 5, 1964).
147. The same observations may be made concerning Senator Clark's
remarks on April 8, 1964. It must be stressed that those remarks were made
by him as one of the floor managers of the House version of the bill, which
was substantially revised later by the Senate.
148. On May 5, 1953, a bill was introduced in the Senate to make it an
unfair labor practice for an employer or union to discriminate on the basis
of race, religion, color, or national ancestry. S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. It
was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, but was not
reported out. 99 CONG. REc. 4437 (1953).
149. Senator Prouty introduced his amendment as a substitute for title




unfair labor practice subject to the affirmative relief which the
NLRB could then grant.
Actually, the legislative history is inconclusive, and it is far
better to resolve the question of remedies for racial discrimination
under the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations
Act, in view of adoption of the Civil Rights Act, by reference to
potential conflicts among the enforcement procedures which would
be involved. Here the "leadership compromise" becomes signifi-
cant.
When adoption of the Civil Rights Act was threatened in the
late spring of 1964, various compromises were reached. Senators
Humphrey and Dirksen were the key leaders for their respective
parties. The new bill, negotiated in informal conferences, was
adopted by the Senate, and the House then voted to accept the
Senate bill without any changes. The compromises reached shortly
before the vote may be characterized as the "leadership compro-
mise." The most important change in title VII of the House bill
involved the enforcement procedure. The changes made and the
enforcement procedures adopted are described in part II of this
article.
To what extent should these critical changes be deemed to
have affected rights and remedies for racial discrimination under
the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act?
Administration of these three statutes must be accommodated
so as to give reasonable weight to the policies underlying each
of them. The Supreme Court has been faced with the problem
of accommodation of federal statutes in previous cases. In Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & No. W.R.R.,o50 the Court had
to accommodate the underlying policies of the Railway Labor
Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Interstate Commerce
Act in determining whether a strike against job abolition could
be enjoined. In another case involving accommodation the Court
said: "We hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read
alone in matters dealing with railway labor disputes. There must
be an accommodation of that statute and the Railway Labor Act
so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is pre-
served."-' Under the National Labor Relations Act, the Court
was faced with the question as to whether recognition picketing
by a minority union was an unfair labor practice under a sec-
150. 862 U.S. 830 (1960). The Court held that the strike could not be
enjoined.




tion'5 ' of the NLRA adopted in 1947 when an affirmative answer
would have conflicted with the administration of another unfair
labor practice section'5 s adopted in the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959. In relying on the subsequent
congressional adoption of the latter statute in holding that the
union's picketing was not a violation of the earlier provision of
the NLRA,"'4 the Court's decision makes great practical sense.
Other cases raising the issue of accommodation involved the
matter of whether a state or the NLRB should enforce state
right-to-work laws"" and the matter of whether a federal court
may enjoin a strike in breach of contract under the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 in view of the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.15 Hence there is prece-
dent for consulting various statutes applicable to labor disputes
in determining the proper scope and application of a given statute.
C. Rzx ms NOT INVOLVING SEIIOUS CONFICT WITH TITLE
VII
Under the Railway Labor Act it was long established, as a re-
sult of the Steele case, that Negroes could institute a court action
to enjoin an exclusive bargaining representative from violating
its duty of fair representation. To continue the availability of
this remedy is not likely to present any serious conflict with the
administration of title VII of the Civil Rights Act. There is the
theoretical possibility of conflict, but more likely after July 2,
1965, Negroes in such a situation will follow the procedures of
title VII. They are entitled to the free services of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, which will investigate and
152. Section 8(b)(1)(A), added by, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A) (1958).
153. Section 8(b)(7), added by, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(Supp. V, 1964).
154. NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
155. Retail Clerks, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). Not-
ing that problems will arise involving the accommodation of state and federal
jurisdiction, the Court held that "picketing in order to get an employer to
execute an agreement to hire all-union labor in violation of a state union-
security statute lies exclusively in the federal domain . .. [citing cases] because
state power, recognized by § 14(b), begins only with actual negotiation and
execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)." Id. at 105.
156. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 870 U.S. 195 (1962). Citing sections of
the Taft-Hartley and of the Norris-LaGuardia Acts, the dissent asserted that
the Court's duty therefore, "is to seek out that accommodation of the two




through its expertise in dealing with racial discrimination will
attempt to secure compliance with the statute by persuasion.'5 7
If such an attempt fails and the aggrieved individuals are forced
to take the case to court to obtain relief, they should be allowed
to maintain a class suit.x5 s The court may appoint an attorney
for them. The court may permit institution of suit without pay-
ment of fees, costs, or security. If the Negroes prevail, the court
may permit recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the
costs. And the court, in addition to granting an injunction, may
order other appropriate affirmative action.
With such advantages Negroes in the situation of those in the
Steele and subsequent cases under the Railway Labor Act more
likely would seek to use the benefits of title VII. Since the Steele
case, according to Professor Sovern, Negroes have gone to court
to redress unfair representation on an average of less than once a
year.xco Sovern attributes this fact in part to the expense involved
in obtaining counsel. Moreover, the results of a study published
in 1964 suggest that the injunction remedy against the union has
been inadequate. With respect to damages the author states that
"in the twenty years since the Steele decision, Negro plaintiffs
have claimed upwards of $6,000,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages. They have actually collected $2,802 of the former and
$3,000 of the latter."160 There is no reason to believe that litiga-
tion based on racial discrimination is likely to increase under the
Railway Labor Act. On the contrary, it is likely to decrease as the
procedures of title VII become effective and Negroes take advan-
tage of them. Since title VII undoubtedly covers the kind of
union conduct involved in the Steele case, litigation under the
Steele theory is likely to become de minimis. The occasional case
will present no serious threat to implementation of title VII. Since
the Railway Labor Act provides no administrative remedy for
157. The fruits of the investigation can be made available to the
Attorney-General and to the aggrieved. Berg, supra note 118, at 91.
158. Even if suit were brought individually, it is possible that class relief
could be afforded. See Bailey v. Patterson, 328 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963).
159. Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act:
The Brave New Wrold of Miranda, N.Y.TJ. 16TH CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3,
5 (1963). For the observation that expense and delay in litigation have dis-
couraged suits against unions for breach of the duty of fair representation, see
Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations:
Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 391, 399-400 (1964); Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 547, 557-58
(1963).
160. Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 Mo. L. REv. 113, 144 (1964).
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such conduct, obviously there is no threat in this respect to
proper implementation of title VII.0 1e On these practical bases
the Supreme Court should conclude that rulings in prior cases
under the Railway Labor Act (in both racial and nonracial dis-
crimination cases) are unaffected by adoption of the Civil Rights
Act.162
With respect to relief under the National Labor Relations Act
for breach of a union's duty of fair representation, the problem
should be divided into consideration of those cases involving
direct judicial relief and those cases involving relief from the
NLRB. The Civil Rights Act clearly does not affect those cases
in which a court has granted relief for breach of the duty of fair
representation based on a type of discrimination not covered by
title VII. Nor should the Civil Rights Act be deemed to affect
those cases where a court has granted relief for breach of the
duty of fair representation based on racial discrimination. Insofar
as the Civil Rights Act is concerned, no serious threat is posed
by continuation of the judicial remedy under the National Labor
Relations Act. The reasons for this conclusion are the same as
those discussed in connection with the Railway Labor Act. Any
potential conflict is more theoretical than real.
Whether the NLRB should be allowed to grant relief for breach
of a union's duty of fair representation is far more troublesome.
Since the services of the Board are free, attempts to use such
services are far more likely. Nevertheless, the Board should be
deemed to have the discretion to invoke a series of remedies
under Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act in both
racial and nonracial discrimination cases which involve breach
of the duty of fair representation. The remedy of revocation of
certification was well established, not only prior to the Civil
Rights Act but also prior to the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959. Refusal of the Board to apply its contract bar rule
161. In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963), the Court held that neither the Railway Labor Act
nor the Federal Aviation Act, which do not provide an administrative remedy,
had preempted the field so as to preclude the state from enforcing its anti-
discrimination law against an employer.
162. It is recognized that these considerations could justify the conclusion
that the Supreme Court would not be taking a major step if it held that
title VII preempted remedies under the Railway Labor Act for racial dis-
crimination. Now that Congress has established an express remedy against
racial discrimination, it is no longer necessary to draw inferences from the
terms of the Railway Labor Act.
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in representation cases where the union was discriminating on
racial grounds was established long before adoption of the Civil
Rights Act. These remedies should not be viewed as preempted
by the Civil Rights Act. Nor should the related remedy of refusal
of the Board to certify a racially discriminating union be viewed
as barred by the Civil Rights Act. Though not arising under sec-
tion 9, the Board ought to be able to refuse to order an employer
to bargain with a union discriminating on racial grounds. Such
remedies do not seriously conflict with the relief a court is likely
to grant under the Civil Rights Act, and in any event, such
remedies more properly fall within the Board's domain in policing
representation cases. To hold otherwise would mean that the
NLRB must validate a bargaining representative acting in viola-
tion of national policy.
Such remedies, however, do not involve affirmative relief of the
type granted under the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the
Board. Where the Board grants affirmative relief under this juris-
diction in cases involving racial discrimination, there is far more
likelihood of conflict with the "leadership compromise" adopted
in title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Of course, no conflict arises where the invidious treatment of
an employee by a union is not of the type covered by title VII.
Hence no conflict arises from the adoption of the majority position
of the NLRB in the Miranda Ftel case which did not involve
discrimination covered by title VII. It has been said that Miranda
is a weak case to support the theory of the majority of the
Board."" But even if this were so, it is no reason to reject the
theory as applied to cases not covered by title VII.
Though not particularly numerous, there are cases not covered
by title VII to which the Board's theory that breach of the duty
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice should be applied.
In addition to the arbitrary treatment of truck driver Lopuch
in the Miranda Fuel case, the situation in Union News Co. v.
Hildreth'4 may be cited as an example. In that case the union
in effect agreed to the discharge of the plaintiff for theft, even
though there was no proof that she was guilty. Probably no arbi-
trator would have sustained the discharge of this 10 year em-
ployee under the contract provision which required just cause
163. Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act:
The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16Tm CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3, 8
(1963).
164. 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961), af'd on rehearing, 315 F.2d 548 (6th
Cir. 1963).
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for discharge. Yet the union refused to handle her grievance.o 5
Still another example involves the situation where a union bases
its discriminatory treatment of employees solely on the political
power of a given local union.0e As a practical matter employees
are often powerless to obtain relief in these situations if the
Board's theory that breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion is an unfair labor practice is not sustained. Despite the
broad discretion which a union must have in the negotiation and
administration of a collective bargaining agreement, such power
should not be limitless. And because of the experience of the
Board with labor disputes it is in a better position than the
courts to determine whether a union has gone beyond the bounds
of reasonable exercise of discretion and, if so, what the remedy
should be.'0 7
Hence there are sound policy reasons for permitting the Board
to determine whether an alleged breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an unfair labor practice in a case not covered by
title VII. Such a position recognizes the responsibilities of a bar-
gaining agent given special status by the NLRA,e 8 and it is
165. The company, convinced that mishandling and thefts by employees
were the cause of the increased costs of operating a lunch counter, was able
to persuade the union to agree to a layoff of half the employees to see if the
situation would improve. After the layoff there was such an improvement, and
the union then agreed to the discharge of the laid-off employees. The plain-
tiff, a waitress with 10 years' seniority, was unable to persuade the union or
the employer to process her grievance. Hence she brought suit against her
employer. Although the Sixth Circuit recognized that her individual guilt
had not been established, it nonetheless decided in favor of the defendant,
holding that the bilateral decision of the union and the employer to discharge
the plaintiff should not be upset.
166. See Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1961). Although this case involved employees subject to the Railway Labor
Act, similar problems arise under the NLEA. See the analysis of such cases
in Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MIcH. L. REV.
1435, 1479-95 (1963).
167. Between the Board's 1962 decision in Miranda Fuel and its 1964
decision in Hughes Tool, it dismissed four cases involving allegations of viola-
tion of the duty of fair representation. Armored Car Chauffeurs Union (United
States Trucking Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 225 (1963); New York Typographical
Union (New York Times Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1963); Millwrights Union
(Planet Corp.), 144 NJL.R.B. 798 (1963); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1963). None of these cases involved racial discrimination
or other invidious treatment of employees, and in each of them there was
a legitimate basis for the union's action.
168. The union often has available the alternative of taking the em-
ployee's grievance to arbitration. The NLRB would probably defer to the
arbitration award. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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possible to find a rational statutory basis for this position under
Section 8(b)(1)(A), Section 8(b)(2), or Section 8(b)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act. The arguments which justify use
of these sections to support the theory of the majority of the
Board have been noted in part I of this article. If a choice has
to be made, it would seem that section 8(b)(1)(A) provides the
best support for this theory. Some of the principles of law con-
tained in section 9 must be read into portions of section 7 to
make section 7 meaningful,e 9 and restraint or coercion of rights
guaranteed by section 7 constitute an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b) (1) (A). As between sections 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (3), the
latter provides a better vehicle for supporting the theory of the
majority of the Board that breach of the duty of fair representation
is an unfair labor practice. Superficially, section 8(b) (2) is appeal-
ing because it expressly refers to discrimination. But it refers to
discrimination for a specific purpose - to encourage or discour-
age membership in a labor organization -and is not as broadly
applicable to cases of arbitrary treatment of employees as section
8(b) (3). To the argument that under the position advocated here
there would be some overlap in the coverage of the unfair labor
practice provisions, it may be replied that Congress was not un-
duly concerned with overlap of this type. Clearly some of the
employer unfair labor practice provisions overlap each other.'
D. REMEDIES INVOLVING UNDUE CONFLICT WITH TITLE VII
Although the theory of the majority of the NLRB that breach
of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice
should be sustained by the courts in those cases where title VII
is not applicable, the NLRB should be precluded from asserting
its unfair labor practice jurisdiction when the basis for the al-
leged breach of the duty is an unlawful employment practice
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Otherwise the carefully
designed procedures for implementation of title VII will be frus-
trated. The NLRB procedures are substantially different from
those contemplated by title VII.
The procedures under title VII, as negotiated in the "leader-
ship compromise," differ in many respects. Where a state pro-
169. Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance - Whose Grievance Is
it?, 11 Frir. L. REv. 35 (1949); Sovern, Race Discrimination and the National
Labor Relations Act: The Brave Newo World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 8, 12-13 (1963).
170. Section 8(a)(1) clearly overlaps other § 8(a) employer unfair labor
practices.
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hibits the unlawful employment practice alleged by the aggrieved
individual, the latter is precluded from filing a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission until the state has
been given a specified period of time to try to remedy the prob-
lem.' 7' The Commission is required to defer to the state.172 The
Commission is authorized to cooperate with state and local agen-
cies, to utilize their services, and to reimburse them for their
services. It is further contemplated that the Commission will
enter into agreements with such agencies under which the Com-
mission shall refrain from processing charges in certain kinds of
cases and under which no person would be permitted to maintain
a civil action in any of the cases so specified. According to the
Labor Department 22 states qualify for such agreements with
the Commission."'
The NLRB does not defer to state agencies. If the NLRB
were to assert its unfair labor practice jurisdiction in title VII
cases, the agencies and laws of 22 states would be by-passed.
The same observation would be valid if the Commission were to
defer to the NLRB. The carefully chosen structure for enforce-
ment of title VII would be undermined insofar as union activities
are concerned.
Under title VII procedures a charge of an unlawful employ-
ment practice must be filed with the Commission within certain
periods of time. The period of time may be 30, 90, or 210 days,
depending on the conditions as specified in the statute.' The
six-months time period for filing an unfair labor practice charge
171. Section 706(b), 78 Stat. 259,42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
172. Section 706(b), (c), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b), (c)
(1964).
One commentator has suggested that unionized workers ignore the pro-
visions of title VII and that such workers should bypass the "procedural
obstacle course" of title VII by seeking relief for racial discrimination from
the NLRB. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (58 L.R.R.) 235 (1965).
178. Section 709(b), 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2oooe-8(b) (1964).
174. 56 LAn. REL. REP. 440 (1964). The 22 states are Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
175. Section 706(d), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). Senator
Humphrey stressed the importance of deferring to state programs as follows:
"We recognized that many States already have functioning antidiscrimination
programs to insure ... equal employment opportunity. We sought merely to
guarantee that these States -and other States which may establish such pro-
grams -will be given every opportunity to employ their expertise and expe-
rience without premature interference by the Federal Government." 110 CONG.
REO. 12299 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
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under the NIRA7 6 is not consistent with the time periods of
title VII. Moreover, rulings of the NLRB may conflict with the
regulations which the Commission may prescribe for labor organi-
zations for the keeping of records, for the posting of notices, and
for various other procedural matters.w
Under title VII the Commission has a designated period of
time to secure voluntary compliance with the statute through
the process of conciliation. 17 s According to Senator (now Vice
President) Humphrey, the Commissioners "are like the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service.""'9 They may mediate, but
they do not have the authority of NLRB personnel.
On the other hand, Commission personnel will develop an
expertise in dealing with racial problems and other problems
covered by title VII.xso Since they will be dealing with such mat-
ters on a daily basis, they will be better suited to working out
a settlement than NIRB personnel whose expertise does not lie
in areas such as racial discrimination.
Further conflict in NLRB and title VII procedures is illus-
trated by the fact that the NLRB holds administrative hearings
and issues cease and desist orders. Authorization for the Commis-
sion to issue cease and desist orders was rejected by Congress. 81
Moreover, the NLRB may seek judicial enforcement of its orders,
while the Commission is not entitled to initiate a civil action on
behalf of the aggrieved.lu
The significantly different procedures under title VII were
deliberately chosen by Congress. For the NLRB to be allowed to
assert its unfair labor practice jurisdiction and grant affirmative
relief for unlawful employment practices under title VII would
constitute undue interference with some of the key procedural
176. Section 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958).
177. See §H 709(c)-(d), 711, 713(a), 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-
8(c)-(d), -10, -19(a) (1964). There may also be potential conflict between an
investigation by the NLRB and an investigation by the Commission under§H 709 and 710.
178. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.CJA. § 20ooe-5(e) (1964).
179. 110 CONG. REc. 13695 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
180. Id. at 13694 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
181. Further elaboration of this point may be found in part ]I of this
article.
182. 110 CONG. REc. 18693-95 (daily ed. June 17, 1964) (remarks of Sen-
ator Humphrey). Another point of conflict involves the four year period for
phasing in the applicability of title VII to unions in accordance with the
number of union members. This phasing in policy would be undermined by




safeguards adopted by Congress. It would mean that state agen-
cies charged with responsibility for the administration of fair
employment practice laws would be bypassed in such cases, and
congressional intent to defer to such agencies would be thwarted.
It would mean that the various time limitations specified in title
VII for the processing of unlawful employment practice charges
could be ignored by the NLRB in dealing with such charges
against unions. It would mean that the congressional compromise
which put so much weight on conciliation and attempts to secure
voluntary compliance through the efforts of those who would
develop special expertise in such matters could be frustrated.
And it would mean that congressional objection to the commence-
ment of a judicial action by a government agency rather than by
the aggrieved individual in such cases was irrelevant.
Moreover, it would mean that the NLRB properly could ex-
tend its remedies under a general theory and under general provi-
sions of a labor statute to give relief for the kinds of discrimination
dealt with in specific terms in a statute which was designed
to provide relief against such discrimination. The courts should
not permit the NLRB to extend its Miranda Fuel theory of 1962
to embrace racial discrimination or other kinds of discrimination
specifically prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 - at least not after the key provisions of title VII become
effective on July 2, 19 65 .113 The NLRA should not be construed
without regard to the impact of such a ruling on another statute.
It is reasonable to carve out of the Miranda Fuel theory those
areas dealt with in specific terms by title VII.'
Congress cannot be deemed to have approved extension of
the Miranda Fuel theory to cover racial discrimination cases.
Hughes Tool was the first case in which this was done, and
Hughes Tool, dated July 1, 1964, was decided after the congres-
sional compromises were reached in the spring of 1964 and after
the Senate had voted on the Civil Rights Act on June 19, 1964.
183. NLRA § 14(c), added by, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)
(Supp. V, 1964), dealing with the jurisdictional standards of the Board, does
not prevent the Board itself from refusing to assert jurisdiction over such
cases.
184. Whatever position a court might have adopted concerning extension
of Miranda Fuel to racial discrimination cases prior to the enactment of title
VII, it is now proper to consider title VIE in construing the application of the
NLRA in this area. When the Supreme Court held that minority union picket-
ing for recognition fell outside the prohibitions of § 8(b)(1)(A), the most
persuasive reason given by the Court was that a contrary holding would
conflict with the subsequently adopted § 8(b)(7). NLRB v. Drivers Local
639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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Although the House voted on the bill one day after the issuance
of the decision in Hughes Tool, it is doubtful that the Repre-
sentatives even knew about the Hughes Tool decision. In any
event, the House simply accepted the Senate bill without change.
Of course, the NLRB will continue to deal with some kinds
of discrimination under its unfair labor practice jurisdiction.
Even if the courts do not endorse the Miranda Fuel theory, the
NLRB must handle cases of discrimination designed to encourage
or discourage membership in a labor organization in violation
of section 8(b) (2). Hence it is obvious that cases may arise which
involve both racial discrimination and some other kind of discrimi-
nation clearly within the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the
NLRB. There will be problems of overlap and problems of line
drawing, but such problems are not novel. They exist under the
present doctrine of federal preemption which the Supreme Court
applies to labor relations affecting interstate commerce. Such
problems exist because of the very nature of our form of govern-
ment. The existence of such problems is no justification for taking
action or refusing to take action which will thwart the will of
Congress.
Whether or not a given case is covered by title VII is a ques-
tion which may give rise to problems. On this score the N-LRB
and others will receive some guidance from the Commission in
its role as an interpreter of title VII, since title VII contemplates
issuance of written interpretations and opinions by the Commis-
sion. Title VII provides that there shall be no liability or punish-
ment if there has been good faith reliance on such interpretation
or opinion by the Commission. It has been suggested that such
opinions will have a legal effect similar to that of the interpretive
bulletins of the Wage-Hour Administrator, and that such opinions
may come to be regarded as a body of experience and informed
judgment to which others may look for guidance.as
CONCLUSION
Undue conflict in the administration of the Railway Labor
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and title VII of the Civil
Rights Act can be avoided by a proper application of a theory
of accommodation. Although the structure for enforcement of
title VII would be seriously undermined if the view were adopted
that all remedies for racial discrimination which might have been
appropriate under the federal labor statutes in the absence of a
185. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 31 BROoKLYN L. REv. 62, 81-82 n.36 (1964).
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civil rights act can be invoked even in the face of the Civil Rights
Act, there is no need to go to the opposite extreme which holds
that title VII has preempted all remedies under the federal labor
statutes for discrimination covered by title VII.
A proper application of a theory of accommodation requires
an appraisal of the actual potential for conflict of any given
remedy with the underlying policies adopted by Congress. Rele-
vant is a consideration of such factors as the degree to which
the given remedy had become firmly embedded in the law prior
to adoption of the Civil Rights Act, the probable awareness by
Congress of the existence of the remedy, and the extent to which
the given remedy would interfere as a practical matter with the
choice that Congress made among the various possible procedures
for implementing title VII. Tested by these criteria, numerous
remedies developed under the Railway Labor Act and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act for breach of a union's duty of fair
representation may still be invoked. But the NLRB should not
be permitted to grant affirmative relief under its unfair labor
practice jurisdiction for breach of a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation based on discrimination covered by title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. For such discrimination title VII procedures
should be followed.
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